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T HE charitable contribution deduction has its roots in the philosophy that
philanthropy should be financed by private enterprise rather than govern-
mental subsidy. However, some individuals, more specifically the wealthy, have
been able to take advantage of the tax system so as to make a profit on the
contribution of property to a charity (as opposed to its sale and retention of the
proceeds). In its zeal to curtail this advantage, Congress provided a reduction
provision that forces a donor to reduce his charitable gift by the amount of any
appreciation which would have been ordinary income if the property had been
sold.1 Additionally, the individual donor must reduce his charitable contribution
by fifty percent of the capital gain appreciation for gifts of tangible personal
property which are put to an unrelated use by the exempt organization, and for
gifts to certain private foundations.! Although the theory behind this con-
gressional tightening-up is quite commendable, the ambiguity of the statutory
language chosen, coupled with the obscure interaction of these new provisions,
has left a myriad of problems for the tax practitioner. Guideposts have been
erected by the Treasury in its proposed regulations, but these regulations are
not the complete answer, and they actually cause some confusion themselves.
In ferreting through this maze, it is clear that many questions remain un-
answered, all the tax advantages of charitable contributions have yet to be
eliminated, and some new inequities have been born.
IINT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 170(e) (1) (A).
'Id. § 170(e) (1) (B).
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I. TRADITIONAL FOUNDATIONS FOR
THE CHARITABLE DEDUCTION
A. Theoretical Justifications
The usual justification given for the allowance of an income tax deduction
for contributions to charities is that such activity is socially desirable and should
be encouraged. In this day of rising costs for charitable organizations, the
argument for the use of tax incentives to further private philanthropy does
make sense.' These contributions support many organizations that would other-
wise have to be state-supported, and in this manner help to relieve the budg-
etary crises of every state and the federal government. This reliance upon the
individual citizen to circumvent the political pressures inherent in any social
welfare system is undoubtedly a result of the individualistic attitude which has
viewed certain areas as appropriate for private, not governmental, financial aid.
On the other hand, it can be argued with equal force that if government-
supported, many charities would either not receive any money at all or their
programs would be more closely scrutinized to eliminate "wasteful" activities
and to continue "worthwhile" ones. This argument would point to the deduc-
tion as a disguised form of federal assistance, delegating the expenditure of
public funds to private persons. Obviously, charities favored by the wealthy
are subsidized more under this system," and the allocation of funds by way of a
tax deduction is less costly to the upper bracket taxpayer.
Whatever one's conclusion concerning the desirability of allowing the tax-
payer to effectively choose the purpose and the organization to which the fed-
eral government will make a partially matching gift, the consensus has been
that such a system is to be encouraged. In addition, a diversity and independ-
ence in the maintenance of charitable organizations has been produced that
would not otherwise have been obtainable
However, even if the arguments for the continuation of the charitable de-
duction are accepted,' these philosophical postulates do not justify the mainte-
nance of the present system if it can be shown that the amount of giving en-
couraged by the tax incentive is small when compared to the revenue loss
' For a critical analysis of the effectiveness of tax incentives in promoting a governmental
policy, see Surrey, Tax Incentives-Conceptual Criteria for Identification and Comparison
with Direct Governmental Expenditures, in TAX INCENTIVES 3 (1971).
' For figures showing the skewing of heavy charitable contributors toward the upper
income brackets, see H. KAHN, PERSONAL DEDUCTIONS IN THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX
46-91, 208-11, 216-29 (1960); STUDIES IN SUBSTANTIVE TAX REFORM 52 (A. Willis ed.
1969) [hereinafter cited as STUDIES).
"R. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 169-71 (1964).
' Some commentators have developed their own income tax systems with varying ap-
proaches for the charitable deduction. These include: R. GOODE, supra note 5, at 168-75;
J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 78 (1966); D. SMITH, FEDERAL TAX REFORM 101-07
(1961); Gelfand, The Individual Income Tax Base and the Charitable Contributions De-
duction, in HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86TH CONG., 1ST SEss., TAX RE-
VISION COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS ON BROADENING THE TAX BASE 441 (Comm. Print
1959). Presumably, the charitable deduction would also be a relic of the past if the com-
prehensive tax base proposals were codified into the revenue laws. See generally A COM-
PREHENSIVE INCOME TAX BASE? A DEBATE (1968); C. GALVIN & B. BITTKER, THE IN-
COME TAX: How PROGRESSIVE SHOULD IT BE? (1969); H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME
TAXATION (1938); THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (R. Haig ed. 1921); Bittker, A "Com-
prehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925 (1967).
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involved. In 1954 the charitable contribution amounted to one-third of all the
deductions taken by living donors,7 while in 1965 the fraction was estimated
to be approximately one-fourth.8 After breaking down the taxpaying populus
into income types, the introduction of the standard deduction in 1940 did not
seem to have any measurable effect on charitable giving. Thus, the inference is
that the tax incentives of the charitable contribution do not have an effect on
those in the twenty- to thirty-percent tax bracket.! For those donors in the higher
income tax brackets, the charitable deduction amounts to a larger percentage
of total deductions." Although the effect of reform on the contribution habits
of these donors is not yet known, it is clear that a reduction in their charitable
deductions will greatly increase tax revenue."
B. Historical Development
The basic congressional approach toward charitable contributions from 1917
to 1969 has been one of expansion. The Revenue Act of 1917" for the first
time added a provision that would allow a taxpayer to deduct a charitable con-
tribution from his net income. 3 It was feared that without this provision, such
contributions would decline because of high tax rates, 4 and coupled with this
was the fear that the amount which the charity might otherwise receive from
governmental support would not be great." The Revenue Act of 1918" extend-
ed charitable contributions to include gifts to a special fund for vocational re-
habilitation, the Revenue Act of 1924" introduced the unlimited deduction,
and the Revenue Act of 193618 authorized corporations to deduct their con-
tributions to charities.
The expanding liberalization of a deduction for charitable gifts paused brief-
ly in 1938. In that year the House Ways and Means Committee proposed that
the allowable deduction for a gift of property be limited to the lesser of the
donor's adjusted basis therein or the fair market value of the property contri-
buted." Although the House argued that such a proposal was necessary in view
of the practice of allowing a deduction in the year of contribution for untaxed
income," the Senate deleted this provision, believing that charitable gifts ought
to be encouraged."
Having weathered the 1938 storm, the charitable deduction continued on a
generally liberalized course. In 1952 the maximum charitable deduction limit
'H. KAHN, supra note 4, at 72.
8R. GOODE, supra note 5, at 171.
' Id. at 172; STUDIES 52.
"A graph depicting a correlation of charitable contribution deductions as a percentage
of the total personal deductions to the different classes of adjusted income can be derived
from the tabular computations as set forth by R. GOODE, supra note 5, at 324.
"STUDIES 50-51.
"2Ch. 63, § 1201 (2), 40 Stat. 330.
"' A similar provision was proposed for the Revenue Act of 1913, but it did not pass
the Congress. 50 CONG. REC. 1259 (1913) (remarks of Congressman Rogers).
"4 H. KAHN, supra note 4, at 6-7, 46-47.
1155 CONG. REc. 6728 (1917) (remarks of Senator Hollis).
18 Ch. 18, 5 214(a) (11), 40 Stat. 1069.
"Ch. 234, 5 21 4 (a) (10), 43 Stat. 253.
18Ch. 690, 5 23(g), 49 Star. 1648, 1661.
I9 H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 35 (1938).
20 Id.
21S. REP. No. 1567, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 14 (1938).
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was increased from fifteen to twenty percent,2 and in 1956 the unlimited deduc-
tion was liberalized." Thus, prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1969,4 it could be
generally said that the contribution of appreciated property to a charity gave
rise to a charitable deduction for the full fair market value of the property
contributed" with no taxation with respect to its appreciation, 6 except to the
extent that the gain would have been subject to sections 1245 (a),' 1250(a) ,2
or 617(d)."9
Following the trend of legislative history reflecting a congressional intent
of encouraging charitable giving to the institution of the taxpayer's choice,
while rewarding him at the same time," the courts took the position that the
charitable contribution provisions of the revenue acts should be liberally con-
strued.3 From this background Congress engrafted new concepts in 1969 upon
the basic rationale that the charitable contribution should be encouraged via
a tax incentive, but at the same time that the flagrant advantages available to
the high income bracket donor on the contribution of property, as opposed to
cash, should be eliminated."2
II. ORDINARY INCOME PROPERTY
A. Provisions Applicable to All Ordinary Income Property
1. The Problem. Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1969 the contribution of
property to a charity that possessed only ordinary income appreciation allowed
the donor to bypass tax on this appreciation and yet obtain a charitable de-
duction for the full fair market value of the property. Thus, the contribution
of property with a fair market value of $10,000, a basis of $4,000, and $6,000
ordinary income appreciation would allow the donor a $10,000 charitable con-
tribution. This contribution would be worth $7,000 to him, if he were in the
"Act of July 8, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-465, § 4(b), 66 Stat. 443.
"
3 Act of February 15, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-1022, § 1, 70 Stat. 1117.
' Tax Reform Act of 1969, 83 Star. 487 (codified in scattered sections of INT. REV.
CODE of 1954).
'
2 L.O. 1118, 11-2 CuM. BULL. 148 (1923); Rev. Rul. 55-410, 1955-1 CuM. BULL.
297; Treas. Reg. § 1.1 70-1(c) (1), T.D. 6605, 1962-2 CUM. BULL. 76. However, if there
was an agreement that the taxpayer would repurchase the property, then the amount paid to
repurchase the property from the charity would be regarded as a charitable contribution
rather than as giving the donor a step-up in basis. Rev. Rul. 67-178, 1967-1 CuM. BULL.
64. But cf. Sheppard v. United States, 176 Ct. Cl. 244, 361 F.2d 972 (1966).
"Campbell v. Prothro, 209 F.2d 331 (5th Cit. 1954); White v. Brodrick, 104 F. Supp.
213 (D. Kan. 1952).
"Act of December 31, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 13(d), 76 Star. 1034.
"
8 Act of December 31, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 231(b) (1), 78 Stat. 105.
"Act of September 12, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-570, § I(b), 80 Stat. 762.
so Custy, The Deduction of a Charitable Contribution of the Use of Property Under the
Federal Income Tax, 40 MISS. L.J. 329, 336-38 (1969).
" Judicial expressions giving a liberal construction to the charitable contributions of
the Code include: Old Colony Trust v. Commissioner, 301 U.S. 379 (1937); Helvering v.
Bliss, 293 U.S. 144 (1934); United States v. Provident Trust Co., 291 U.S. 272 (1934);
Edwards v. Slocum, 264 U.S. 61 (1924); Faulkner v. Commissioner, 112 F.2d 987 (1st
Cir. 1940); Harrison v. Baker Annuity Fund, 90 F.2d 286 (7th Cit. 1937); Cochran v.
Commissioner, 78 F.2d 176 (4th Cit. 1935); Sheppard v. United States, 176 Ct. Cl. 244,
361 F.2d 972 (1966); Beggs v. United States, 89 Ct. Cl. 39, 27 F. Supp. 599 (1939);
Bowman v. Commissioner, 16 B.T.A. 1157 (1929).
2 For an insight into how tax measures become part of the Code, see Cary, Pressure
Groups and the Revenue Code: A Requiem in Honor of the Departing Uniformity of the
Tax Laws, 68 HARV. L. REV. 745 (1955); Surrey, The Congress and the Tax Lobbyist--
How Special Tax Provisions Get Enacted, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1145 (1957).
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seventy-percent tax bracket.' This situation is contrasted to the donor's selling
the asset and retaining the proceeds. In this latter circumstance the seventy-
percent tax levied upon the $6,000 appreciation would amount to $4,200,
which would leave the donor $5,800 after taxes as compared to $7,000 net in
the case of a contribution.' Obviously, the donor was able to profit taxwise
from his charitable inclinations.'
2. Congressional Response. In order to eliminate these advantages to the donor,
the Treasury recommended to the House Ways and Means Committee that the
charitable contribution be reduced by that amount which would have been
ordinary income or short-term capital gain if the property had been sold at its
fair market value rather than donated." This proposal would have effectively
limited the donor's charitable contribution to his adjusted basis in such prop-
erty.
However, the House Ways and Means Committee went beyond the Treasury
recommendations and proposed that on the charitable contribution of property,
which contained ordinary income appreciation, the donor be required to either:
(a) reduce the charitable contribution to his cost or other basis in the property,
or (b) take a charitable contribution for the full fair market value of the
property and include the untaxed appreciation in income.' The proposal was
" If the donated property consisted of inventory the cost of which was included in the
donor's inventory at the beginning of the year of contribution, there would have to be a
removal of the cost of the contributed item from inventory. Otherwise the cost of goods
sold account would be excessive, thereby improperly reducing the income attributable to the
inventory sold during the contribution year. Rev. Rul. 55-138, 1955-1 CUM. BULL. 223.
' The tax savings to the donor in such a circumstance, as initially viewed by the House,
H.R. REP. No. 91-413 (Part 1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 51-52 (1969), was $11,200 consisting
of $7,000 effective value of the charitable deduction and $4,200 which the donor did not
have to pay in income taxes. Although this same viewpoint was carried forward by the Sen-
ate, S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 80 (1969), it relates only to the cost of the
gift to the Government. The example in the text sets forth the donor's net worth increment
as being $1,200 ahead in the case of a contribution as opposed to a sale. This net worth
figure, and not the amount of tax which would or would not have been paid, is the im-
portant computation for the donor.
With ordinary income property a donor, prior to the Tax Reform Act, could calculate
when a contribution would give him a greater net worth increment (as opposed to a sale of
the asset with the retention of the proceeds) by the following formula: S = (V + T) - F.
Here S is the savings to the donor by making a contribution rather than a sale, V is the
value of the charitable contribution to the donor, T is the amount of tax which would have
to be paid on the appreciation if the property had been sold, and F is the fair market value
of the property in question. With the fact situation portrayed in the text, the formula would
yield:
S = ($7,000 + $4,200) - $10,000 = $1,200.
When S is a positive number, there is a greater savings by the contribution route; when it is
a negative number, there is a greater savings by the sale of the asset with a retention of the
proceeds. It might also be noted that for the donor in the 70% tax bracket, the ordinary in-
come appreciation must be at least 43% of the fair market value of the property for a
greater savings to be gained by the contribution route. As the tax bracket of the donor de.
creases, the appreciation must be a larger portion of the fair market value of the property.
For a similar formula concerning capital gain property see notes 77-78 infra.
" The implication that tax avoidance is the purpose of every gift is erroneous because
it assumes that the taxpayer would have sold the property in any event. If this property had
been retained, the donor would have had $10,000. However, since ordinary income property
is usually designed to be sold, Congress was justified in seeking to overturn the old rules.
Myers & Quiggle, Charitable Contributions and Bequests by Individuals: The Impact of the
Tax Reform Act, 39 FORDHAM L. REv. 185, 194 (1970).
'0 Hearings on H.R. 13270 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 5152-53 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 House Hearings].37 H.R. REP. No. 91-413 (Part 1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 54-55 (1969).
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based upon three objectionable features of allowing the donor to realize greater
benefits on the contribution of the appreciated property to a charity as opposed
to its sale and retention of the proceeds: (1) the charitable motive for giving
seems to be lacking, (2) the government is almost the sole contributor in such
circumstances, and (3) the only donors to gain this benefit are usually in the
very high tax brackets."'
The view of the evils available on the contribution of ordinary income
property to a charity as espoused by the House Ways and Means Committee
was basically concurred in by the Senate Finance Committee. Under the Senate
version of the Act ordinary income appreciation would go to reduce the value
of the donor's charitable contribution, but there would be no election available
to deduct the full fair market value of this property and include the apprecia-
tion in income." The same view was accepted by the conference committee. 1
The statutory product of this congressional attempt to limit the advantages
available to high income donors on the contribution of appreciated ordinary
income property to a charity found fruition in section 170(e) (1) (A)." The
pertinent provision states:
The amount of any charitable contribution of property otherwise taken into ac-
count under this section shall be reduced by the sum of-
(A) the amount of gain which would not have been long-term capital gain
if the property contributed had been sold by the taxpayer at its fair market
value (determined at the time of such contribution). .
(a) "Would Not Have Been Long-Term Capital Gain." Section 170(e)-
(1) (A) plainly provides that a charitable contribution to any charity, includ-
ing a public charity," is reduced by the amount of appreciation which would
have been ordinary income if the property had been sold at its fair market value
rather than donated. Thus, for ordinary income propertyo which has a fair
31 Id. at 54.
39S. REp. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 81-82 (1969).
40 The deletion of the provision to allow the inclusion of the appreciation in the donor's
tax base and a charitable contribution for the full fair market value of the property was most
probably based upon the argument that this was a significant departure from the accepted
practice of not taxing unrealized appreciation as income. Hearings on H.R. 13270 Before the
Senate Comm. on Finance, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 Sen-
ate Hearings]. But see S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 334-36 (1969).41 H.R. REP. No. 91-782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 293-94 (1969).
41 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 170(e) (1) (A).
3Id.
"The term "public charity" is a shorthand expression for the charities which a contribu-
tion thereto allows a deduction for the donor in an amount up to 50% of his contribution
base. These types of organizations are set out in § 170(b) (1) (A).
4"Ordinary income property" is defined as property where any portion of the gain on
which would have not been long-term capital gain if it had been sold by the donor at its
fair market value at the time of the contribution to the charity. This includes: property
held by the donor primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business, works
of art created by the donor, manuscripts prepared by the donor, capital assets held by the
donor for less than 6 months, § 306 stock, and stock to which §§ 341 (a) and 1248 (a)
apply. However, this does not include an income interest for which a deduction is allowed
under § 170(f) (2) (B). Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4(b) (1), 36 Fed. Reg. 6091
(1971). But see H.R. 9505, CCH 1972 STAND. FED. TAX REP. § 6161. Under this pending
legislation all those not eligible for capital gain treatment in accordance with § 1221(3),
will have to reduce the ordinary appreciation in their charitable donation of copyrights,
literary, musical, or artistic compositions, etc. by only 50%. The donee, which must be de-
scribed in §§ 170(b) (1) (A) (ii), (v), or (vi), must give the donor a written statement
that the property is of historical or artistic significance and that it will be put to a related
[Vol. 25
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market value of $10,000 and a basis of $4,000, the charitable contribution is
reduced by the amount of the ordinary income appreciation ($6,000) to
$4,000." The value of this contribution to a donor in the seventy-percent tax
bracket is $2,800.' , The same principle applies to the ordinary income appreci-
ation of $6,000 or one dollar. Thus, with only one dollar of ordinary income
appreciation involved (if the property had been sold at its fair market value),
the entire amount of the property would be viewed as ordinary income prop-
erty,"8 and the reduction provisions of section 170(e) (1) (A) would apply to
the one dollar appreciation.49
(b) "If the Contributed Property Had Been Sold." This seeming simplistic
operation of the statute contains a flaw in the instance of transfers of property
to a charity in which income must be recognized by the donor on the gift of his
appreciation in the property. Under a literal reading of the statute the amount
of the charitable contribution is reduced by the amount of appreciation which
would not have been long-term capital gain if the property had been sold, so
that the recognition of income by the donor on a "disposition" of the property
would still give rise to a reduction for the amount of the appreciation in the
property contributed."0 Thus, the contribution of an installment obligation to a
charity (which would give rise to ordinary income under section 453 (d)) "
would still require a reduction in the amount of the charitable contribution by
the amount of that ordinary income appreciation.
The proposed regulations attempt to solve this problem by providing that
if gain or income is recognized in the same year as the charitable contribution,
the amount of the contribution is not reduced under section 170(e) (1)."' This
will take care of the situation in which income is recognized to the donor under
section 453 (d) upon the transfer of an installment obligation to a charity and
for the recognition of income to the donor under section 454(b) * upon the
transfer of an obligation issued at a discount. Such is only fair, since penalizing
the donor doubly by having him taxed on the appreciation and at the same
time cause a reduction in the amount of his charitable contribution seems hard-
ly equitable. As the donor will have been taxed on the amount of the apprecia-
tion involved, he will be in the same position as a donor who has contributed
cash to the charity in after-tax dollars.
"use." Not covered by this new exemption are papers of public officials collected in office
or appreciation covered by § 170(e) (1) (B). Thus, it would seem that a "softening" in tax
reform has already begun.
4 See Proposed Treas. Reg. 5 1.170A-4(d), example (1), 36 Fed. Reg. 6092 (1971).
17 The net worth increment which would have been available to the donor on the con-
tribution of this property to a charity before the Tax Reform Act is set forth in note 34
supra. This change in treatment under the Tax Reform Act will put the donor of $10,000
in wages and the donor of $10,000 (consisting of the $4,000 basis here plus $6,000 of
cash) in the same tax position if they are in the same tax bracket. Of course, the assumption
must be made that the $4,000 of basis also represents after-tax dollars.
4 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4(b) (1), 36 Fed. Reg. 6091 (1971).
41Of course, if only $1 of the $6,000 appreciation is ordinary income, then the remain-
ing $5,999 would not be subject to reduction under § 170(e) (1) (A).
"9Taggart, The Charitable Deduction, 26 TAX L. REV. 63, 109-13 (1970).
5 1 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 453(d).
"
5 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4(a), 36 Fed. Reg. 6090 (1971).5 3 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 454(b).
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B. Section 306 Stock
Prior to the Tax Reform Act a taxpayer could donate section 306 stock 4 on
which he had paid no income taxes at its receipt to a charity and receive a
charitable contribution for the full fair market value of this property without
recognizing any income on the contribution or the subsequent sale of the
property by the charity." The abuses inherent in section 306 stock took the
form of an outright contribution to the charity rather than a bargain sale be-
cause the bargain sale route would not have been a totally effective means of
sheltering this section 306 stock from ordinary income taxation. The problem
with the bargain sale, as with other sales, redemptions, or dispositions, was
that ordinary income was generated in the sum of the amount realized rather
than just the gain element."'
The Act has essentially eliminated this method of relieving the section 306
stock classification. 8 Since section 170(e) (1) (A) requires a reduction of the
charitable contribution in the amount of gain which would have been ordinary
income if the property were sold, the value of the charitable contribution of
this stock will be zero. (This assumes that the amount which would have been
realized upon a sale is not in excess of the amount which would have been con-
sidered a dividend if money had been distributed by the corporation rather than
stock when the donor first received this section 306 stock.)" However, the
question remains whether the unused portion of the section 306 stock basis
should be added back to the basis of the common stock with respect to which
the dividend was declared. The regulations provide for this in the case of a
sale,"0 and it would seem that the same treatment should prevail in the instance
of a charitable gift which has been reduced by the amount of its inherent ordi-
nary income element."
C. Stock Rights
Prior to the Act the taxpayer could purchase for $1,000 stock in a corpora-
tion which had announced that it would declare a dividend and then sell the
shares in the market at their discounted value (e.g., $900) after the stock had
gone ex-rights. The taxpayer could then take a $100 loss, contribute the rights
541d. § 306(c).
5" INT. REV. CODE of 1954, ch. 736, § 305 (a), 68A Star. 90. Now a preferred stock divi-
dend is taxed as ordinary income if there is a disproportionate distribution. Tax Reform Act
of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 421 (a), 83 Stat. 614, amending INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
305 (b) (2), (3).
'"Rev. Rul. 57-328, 1957-2 CUM. BULL. 229.
5'7 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, 05 30 6 (a) (1) (A), (a) (2); Treas. Reg. § 1.306-1(b) (1)
(1955).
68 Presumably, the gift of § 306 stock will result in a reduction of the contribution by
the amount which would have been ordinary income if the property had been sold to an
unrelated party. In this way it would seem that the exception of § 306(b) (1) providing
that the termination of the taxpayer's entire interest in this stock eliminates § 306 classifica-
tion would not apply (assuming that the charity would be classified as an unrelated party
so as to cause the non-application of § 170(e) (1) (A)). However, it is submitted that a
taxpayer's contribution of § 306 stock, which terminates his entire interest in the corpora-
tion, should not be subject to reduction under § 170(e) (1) (A). Any other result is ex-
tremely inequitable.611d. §§ 306(a), (c).
" Treas. Reg. § 1.306-1(b) (2) (1955).
61 Taggart, supra note 50, at 112.
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to a charity, and receive a $100 charitable deduction. Since the rights would
normally have been ordinary income if sold," section 170(e) (1) (A) elimi-
nated the charitable deduction.
If the taxpayer elects, however, under section 307(b) (2) " to allocate a
portion of the stock basis to the rights, then the reduction under section 170-
(e) (1) (A) would be minimal; but at the same time, the loss on the sale
would also be minimal."4 If alternatively this election were not made, a tax-
payer in the seventy-percent bracket could wait more than six months to con-
tribute the stock rights to a public charity, then as long as the capital gains tax
on the appreciation was less than an effective rate of thirty percent, he would be
better off to sell the rights and retain the proceeds." Thus, no substantial loop-
hole remains in the area of the contribution of stock rights.
D. Nonresident Aliens
The phrase "would not have been long-term capital gain"" does not seem to
present interpretative problems for those such as the nonresident alien, to whom
the ordinary rules of income taxation do not apply. In general, the gross income
of a nonresident alien' can be reduced for those deductions attributable to in-
come effectively connected with a trade or business within the United States."'
However, the nonresident alien's charitable contributions are taken into account
without regard to this limitation after meeting the requirements of section
170.69
If the nonresident alien contributes ordinary income property which is used
in his business within the United States, then the reductions of section 170(e) -
(1) (A) work no hardships on him, since he will be taxed at the normal pro-
gressive rates in any event." As in the instance of a United States citizen, a non-
resident alien's contribution of wages will not be subject to a reduction. How-
ever, the nonresident alien, because of the maximum tax limitation upon wages
which are not effectively connected with a trade or business within the United
States, would be in a better net position by not making any contribution, when
compared to a United States citizen who has the same income."1
"
2 The holding period will start with the acquisition of the stock and normally will be
less than 6 months in such cases. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1223(5).
63 d. S 307(b) (2).
Myers & Quiggle, supra note 35, at 196.6
sSee notes 77-78 infra.




71ld. § 871(b). Ordinary income property for the nonresident alien will most probably
consist of inventory. It may be, however, that a nonresident alien who is not a painter by
profession, could sell one of his paintings in the United States and be subject to a maximum
tax of 30% for income which is not "effectively connected" with a United States trade or
business under section 871 (a) (1). In such a situation the entire ordinary income appre-
ciation would still be subject to reduction under § 170(e) (1) (A) even though a United
States citizen with the same amount of income could be subject to a higher percentage tax
rate. Under § 170(e) the donor's tax bracket is irrelevant.
71 Assume that an unmarried United States citizen has $100,000 in wages and is subject
to a 70% tax rate, while a nonresident alien has $100,000 in wages which is not "effectively
connected" so as to be subject to only a 30% tax rate under § 871(a) (1). A gift of $1,000
in wages would cost the citizen only $300, while it would cost the nonresident alien $700.
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E. Observations on Ordinary Income Property
Congress has effectively limited the charitable contribution to the amount of
the donor's basis therein in the instance of the contribution of ordinary income
property. These rules do not apply to a gift of depreciated property, since there
would have been no gain realized upon the sale of such property;"2 how-
ever, no loophole exists here because the donor would always be in a better
position by retaining the proceeds of a sale rather than contributing the proper-
ty or the sale proceeds to a charity."' Therefore, the contribution of ordinary
income property to a charity is no longer appealing, even though such a gift
to a public charity would be limited to fifty rather than thirty percent of the
donor's contribution base."4
III. Capital Gain Property
As a general proposition capital gain property" is not subject to a reduction
upon its contribution to a charity." The theoretical mainspring of this congres-
sional decision would appear to lie in the realization that with a maximum
capital gains tax of twenty-five percent, it would always be to the taxpayer's
advantage to sell this property and keep the proceeds rather than give it to a
charity." However, with a maximum capital gains tax of, for example, thirty-
72 As was the case prior to the Tax Reform Act, the charitable transfer of property which
has depreciated in value is not considered to be a realization, and, therefore, will not pro-
duce a deductible loss. See Lerner, Charitable Contributions, N.Y.U. 28TH INST. ON FED-
ERAL TAXATION 135, 144 (Supp. 1970).
" For the purposes of the following illustration, assume that the property in question
was purchased for $1,000 and is now worth $800. The donor is in the 70% tax bracket.
Sale of Assets Sale of Assets Value of
Plus Retention Plus Donation Donation
of Proceeds of Proceeds of Asset
(Proceeds Plus (Value of Loss
Value of Loss) Plus Value of
Contribution)
1. Loss Deductible at 70% Rate $940 $700 $560
2. Loss Deductible at 25% Rate $850 $610 $560
3. Loss not Deductible $800 $560 $560
Therefore, it would never be to the advantage of this donor to donate the property to a
charity. Contra, Bransom, Charitable Contributions: New Law Hampers Tax Planning But
Savings Are Still Available, 5 TAX ACCOUNTANTS 324, 325 (1970).
7
4 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 170(b) (1) (A), (D). This, however, is small consola-
tion to the donor, since his contribution has been limited to his basis in the property.
" "Capital gain property" is property where any portion of the gain thereon would have
been long-term capital gain if the property had been sold at the date of contribution at its
fair market value, and is not "Section 170(e) capital gain property." See INT. REv. CODE
of 1954, § 170(b) (1) (D) (iv). "Section 170(e) capital gain property" is capital gain
property which is: (1) contributed to a private foundation other than a foundation de-
scribed in § 170(b) (1) (E), (2) tangible personal property which is put to an unrelated
use by the charitable organization, or (3) 30% capital gain property which is subject to
an election under 5 170(b) (1) (D) (iii).
76 For the exceptions to this general rule see the text accompanying notes 79-113 infra.
"'The formula in use prior to the Tax Reform Act, as set out in E. GRISWOLD, CASES
ON FEDERAL TAXATION 463 (6th ed. 1966), for the determination of when the donor
might be better off to make a charitable contribution than to sell the property and keep
the proceeds is when the value of the property exceeds the product of its
Basis ( tp .25
top marginal rate less .75
Of course, while the maximum ordinary income rates are only 709, it would never be bet-
ter (as regards net gain) for the taxpayer to give the property away rather than selling it
[Vol. 2 5
CHARITABLE GIFTS
two and one-half percent,"8 the wealthy individual who owns property posses-
sing substantial appreciation will still be able to profit by giving this property
to a charity. Ironically, this is what Congress sought to cure in its reform pro-
posals.
A. Tangible Personal Property
1. The Problem. For tangible personal property that would have produced ordi-
nary income upon its sale the charitable contribution reduction rules of section
170(e) (1) (A) adequately handle any problems thus engendered. For other
tangible personal property the problem visualized by Congress appears to have
been that such property usually consisted of works of art, papers, etc. The only
discernible rationale for special treatment of such property appears to be the
large appreciation inherent in these gifts, the problem of overvaluation, and
the fact that only certain donors would be able to take advantage of using such
gifts."
2. Congressional Response. The problem of the contribution of tangible per-
sonal property (other than ordinary income property) was not a target of re-
form under the Treasury proposals for the Nixon Administration. "° However
scant the explanation of the reasoning process involved, the House Ways and
and keeping the proceeds. If he were to make a charitable contribution due to one of those
intangible qualities of goodness, then the best alternative would be to make the gift by
means of appreciated property rather than cash. The rationale is that giving cash is the
giving of after-tax dollars, while the giving of appreciated property allows a full charitable
contribution for the appreciation without having that appreciation taken into income.
7 After the Tax Reform Act if the taxpayer has over $50,000 in capital gain and assum-
ing a 32 % capital gains tax, the effective tax rate on the appreciation (the numerator of
the percentage fraction) would be:
12,500 + .325X
50,000 + X
Here, X equals the appreciation in excess of $50,000. When X equals $100,000 of appre-
ciation ($150,000 total appreciation) the effective tax rate becomes 30%. The formula
now becomes:
.30
top tax rate less .70
Therefore, as the appreciation increases from $150,000 to that amount of appreciation which
would yield an effective tax rate of 321%, the donor will retain a greater net amount by
giving the property to a charity than by selling the property and retaining the proceeds.
(Note that the numerator of the fraction must be recalculated for each specific amount of
appreciation involved, and that this also causes an appropriate reduction in the minus figure
of the fraction's denominator.)7 0H.R. REP. No. 91-413 (Part 1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1969). With such prop-
erty, the only way for the donor to be in a better position by the contribution of this prop-
erty rather than its sale and retention of the assets would be for the value of the charitable
contribution (at the donor's top marginal tax rate) plus the tax on the appreciation to ex-
ceed the value of the property. In this regard, see notes 77-78 supra. However, if the donor
could overvalue the property by only a slight amount, his savings could equal or exceed the
net available from the sale of the property, with a retention of the proceeds. The formula
to determine the overvaluation necessary for the donor to gain more from the contribution
rather than the sale is: Y = A/B. Y is the total overvalued price (which presumably is not
fair market value as no willing buyer would pay that price for the property), A is the
amount the donor would retain on the sale of the property, and B is the donor's top mar-
ginal tax bracket. For property with a fair market value of $100,000 and a basis of $10,000,
the taxpayer would receive a net amount of $70,750 after a 321% capital gains tax. For the
donor to come out ahead on the contribution of this property, it only needs to be overvalued
to Y = 70,750/.70 = $101,108.
o 1969 House Hearings 5152, 5375.
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Means Committee added a reduction for the appreciation inherent in all dona-
tions of tangible personal property. 1
Before the Senate Finance Committee the Treasury noted that the House
solution went beyond its own proposals and took the position that such a treat-
ment was unduly severe. The Treasury based its position on the dependence of
art galleries and museums for such gifts, the irrationality of distinguishing these
gifts from gifts of securities to other charities, and the more efficient procedures
which had been developed to prevent the overvaluation of such gifts.82 In re-
sponse to this argument the Senate Finance Committee deleted the provision
for a reduction of capital gain appreciation in tangible personal property,
pointing out that the same valuation problem would be present if the appreci-
ation were taken into account for tax purposes.' For the committee the proper
remedy to control overvaluations would have been a strengthening of the reve-
nue service's audit procedures."'
In conference committee the unusual step was taken of compromising the
House's inclusion and the Senate's deletion of rules covering the appreciation
of tangible personal property by providing that such property be subject to
special rules of reduction, if the use by the donee of this property was unrelated
to its tax-exempt function." The pertinent provisions of the statute are:
The amount of any charitable contribution of property otherwise taken into
account under this section shall be reduced by the sum of-
(B) in the case of a charitable contribution-
(i) of tangible personal property, if the use by the donee is unrelated to
the purpose or function constituting the basis for its exemption ... 50 percent
(62 1/2 percent, in the case of a corporation) of the amount of gain which
would have been long-term capital gain if the property contributed had been
sold by the taxpayer at its fair market value (determined at the time of such
contribution) .8
(a) Unrelated Use and Ordinary Business Operations. On purely pragmatic
grounds the broad question of the advisability of this provision can be raised.
However, since section 170(e) (1) (B) (i) has been enacted, there is nothing
to do at this point but to either advocate its repeal or live with the consequences
of its ambiguous language. The provision is likely to be in the Code for a
while, so the alternative of clarification by the regulations is mandatory.
Obviously, the critical language is "unrelated to the purpose or function con-
stituting the basis for its exemption."8 The ordinary meaning of the word "use"
is "to employ for some purpose"8 so that it seems fairly clear that the con-
tribution of a painting to a museum would constitute a related use, while the
81H.R. REP. No. 91-413 (Part 1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1969); 1969 Senate Hear-
ings 249.
82 1969 Senate Hearings 570-71.
S However, Senator Albert Gore's argument was that the placing of this appreciation
into income would alleviate and not retain the valuation problem. S. REP. No. 91-552,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 336 (1969).
4 Id. at 82.
82H.R. REP. No. 91-782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 294 (1969).8oINT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 170(e) (1) (B) (i).
8' Id.; see Taggart, supra note 50, at 119-23.
I8THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1573 (1970).
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contribution of the same painting to the Red Cross to be sold with the proceeds
going to purchase medical supplies would not be a related use.89
Some less obvious related uses have been set forth in the proposed regula-
tions. The regulations take the position that the contribution of furniture which
is used in the charity's offices during the regular course of its operations is a
related use." However, it becomes difficult conceptually to distinguish the con-
tribution of furniture, which presumably is to support the bodies of Red Cross
workers while they perform their daily tasks (a related use), from the contri-
bution of a painting to the Red Cross, which is to be immediately sold and the
proceeds used for the benefit of those individuals in need (an unrelated use).
Presumably, if the furniture contributed to the Red Cross qualifies for the chari-
table deduction, then so would the value of a dishwasher which is to be used
in the everyday course of the Red Cross' business to wash dirty coffe cups.9'
If the whole purpose of the unrelated use section is to guarantee that the donor
does not obtain a charitable deduction for the amount of the property con-
tributed unless it is of the same genus as the charity itself, then this end should
be pursued with at least a sense of logic.
Surely the selling of a painting and the "use" of the proceeds therefrom to
aid individuals is an "act of employing" that piece of property for the general
charitable purposes of the Red Cross. However, the "act of employing" a chair
to allow an employee of the Red Cross to sit down does not seem to be related
to the purpose of that organization in aiding the people of the world who are
in need. Of course, the chair would aid the employee who needs to sit down,
but this does not seem to be the logical inference which is to be derived from
the word "use" as set out in the statute.
(b) Unrelated Use and the Reasonable Inference. The regulations do not
give much guidance because of their brevity and opaque distinctions, forcing
the donor in the "gray area" of charitable giving to proceed on a case-by-case
basis. To aid in this determination the donor is allowed to treat the property
as being used in a related capacity by the donee if he can prove in fact that
the property was not put to an unrelated use, or if at the time of the contribu-
tion it was reasonable to anticipate that the property would not be put to an
unrelated use by the donee."2 Because the proposed regulations use the word
"or," the contribution of a Rembrandt painting to a museum which later sells
the painting to purchase a Goya would not cause a reduction in the amount of
the contribution, if there were not a prior agreement concerning the sale. In
such a situation it would have been reasonable for the donor to anticipate that
in due course the painting would have been displayed in the museum in ac-
cordance with its exempt purpose.
" Taggert, supra note 50, at 119-20. Even when medical supplies are donated to a hos-
pital, other surrounding circumstances may prevent a deduction from being taken. See Roger
I. Goodman, 29 CCH Tax. Ct. Mere. 30,121(M) (1970).
"
0 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4(b) (3) (i), 36 Fed. Reg. 6091 (1971).
" The distinction drawn by the proposed regulations becomes even less tenable, as it
allows an individual who purchases an office building which is completely furnished and
who then donates that furniture to the Red Cross to obtain a full deduction for the fair
market value of that furniture.9 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4(b) (3) (ii), 36 Fed. Reg. 6091 (1971).
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However, this provision would not seem to provide any assistance in the
situation of the contribution of a painting to the Red Cross, even if the donor
were convinced that the Red Cross did not plan to sell the painting. The hang-
ing of a painting in the Red Cross headquarters surely would not be a related
use, but then again the contribution of a chair or a desk would be a related
use. Thus, the donor might argue that the painting will be hung in the Red
Cross headquarters to give moral support to the employees in order to allow
them to better fulfill their jobs in helping mankind, much in the same way that
the chair contributed to the organization would take a load off their feet. In
this way, it was reasonable for him to anticipate that the Red Cross would use
the painting in a use related to its exempt function-or was it?
B. Gifts to Private Foundations
Because gifts of appreciated property to private foundations are governed by
such a large and completely interrelating set of rules, a comprehensive study
of their provisions is beyond the scope of this Article." The basic provisions
of the operative statute remained virtually unchanged in its journey through
the House, Senate, and conference Committees."4 The basic reduction provision
here is that of fifty percent of the amount that would have been long-term capi-
tal gain if the property had been sold rather than donated. 5 Private foundations
not subject to this limitation include operating, pass-through, or pooled-income
foundations."
One observation to be made with respect to these provisions is that the ap-
parent intent of Congress was to curtail certain types of private foundations in
response to the adverse criticism they had been receiving. However, this ap-
proach accomplishes nothing more than the elimination of the symptoms rather
than the cause of the disease. The better approach would have been to impose
stricter performance requirements on private foundations. Since such measures
were proposed and enacted, section 170(e) (1) (B) (ii) ' would not seem to
be necessary.""
C. Section 1231 Assets
Section 1231 property" can be used advantageously since it is treated for
charitable contribution purposes as a capital asset, regardless of the net effect
1 See generally INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 501-15, 4940-48; Denny, Investments
Which Jeopardize Charitable Purpose, 24 TAx LAWYER 113 (1970); DeWind & Luey,
Some of the Things You Always Wanted To Know About Private Foundations, 24 TAX
LAWYER 551 (1971); Field, Tax Exempt Status of Universities: Impact of Political Ac-
tivities by Students, 24 TAX LAWYER 157 (1970); Halperin, Private Foundations-Defini-
tion and Termination, N.Y.U. 29TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1783 (1971); Lehrfeld, The
Annual Tax on Foundation Income; Rules Governing Distributions of Income, N.Y.U.
29TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1799 (1971); Moorehead, The Tax Future of Private Founda-
tions: Penalties for Self-Dealing and Jeopardy Investments, N.Y.U. 29TH INST. ON FED.
TAX. 1869 (1971); Troyer, Private Foundations and the Tax Reform Act of 1969: New
Program Restrictions; Business Limitations, N.Y.U. 29TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1909 (1971);
Myers & Quiggle, supra note 35, at 198-201.
9
4 H.R. REP. No. 91-413 (Part 1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 54-55 (1969); H.R. REP.
No. 91-413 (Part 2), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 34-35 (1969); S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 81-82 (1969); H.R. REP. No. 91-782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 293-94 (1969).
"'INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 170(e) (1) (B) (ii).
" Id.
97 Id.
" See 1969 Senate Hearings 1362.
"9NT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1231.
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of the taxpayer's other section 1231 dispositions during the taxable year."
Of course, the rationale for this treatment is that the donor would not know
the treatment to be given this section 1231 property until the tax year was
over, as it would not be until that time that the "hotchpot" classification would
be complete. Since the section 1231 property is given capital asset treatment,
for planning purposes the donor would be well-advised to give such property
to a fifty-percent charity if he already had section 1231 losses, rather than sell
the property and keep the proceeds or give the proceeds to a charity. By giving
the property to a fifty-percent charity, there will be a charitable deduction for
the full fair market value of the property (assuming no recapture), and there
will not be a reduction of the section 1231 ordinary losses because of the gain
realized on the sale of this property."1
D. Nonresident Aliens
For capital gains not effectively connected with a trade or business within the
United States the nonresident alien pays no tax on such gains if he is present
in the country for less than 183 days during the taxable year. If present more
than 183 days, he pays a tax of thirty percent on both long-term and short-term
capital gains.10" For the nonresident alien who has been in the United States
less than 183 days the most reasonable reading of section 170(e)"0 3 is that
there would be no reduction for short-term capital gain property or long-term
capital gain property because section 170(e) specifically relates the amount of
gain subject to reduction to that obtainable "if the property contributed had
been sold by the taxpayer at its fair market value (determined at the time of
such contribution)." ' " Since the nonresident alien would have recognized no
gain, there should be no reduction. This is the interpretation accepted by the
Treasury.1 An alternative interpretation is that there should be a reduction in
any event on these facts by emphasizing the word "gain." ' The only rationale
for the alternative position would be that under section 170(e) (1) (A) there
is a reduction for "the amount of gain which would not have been long term
capital gain" if the property had been sold. Here the gain would not have been
long-term capital gain, so the reduction rules should apply. The obvious flaw
in this argument is that the gain would not have been taxable at all, thereby
making a mockery of the congressional purpose underlying section 170(e).
The Treasury has also provided that short-term capital gains for a nonresi-
dent alien in the United States more than 183 days will not be treated as ordi-
nary income property, but will be subject to reduction only under section 170-
(e) (1) (B) as long-term capital gains." ' This is an equitable result, since the
nonresident alien would be subject to a thirty-percent tax and not a progressive
1
'Id. § 170(e) (1). The only exception is to the extent that the gain from this property
would be ordinary income under the recapture provisions; it is then subject to § 170(e) (1).
See Proposed Treas. Reg. 5 1.170A-4(b) (4), 36 Fed. Reg. 6091 (1971).
101 Taggart, rupra note 50, at 113.1 0 2 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 871(a) (2).
1
"Id. 5 170(e).1 4 Id. 55170(e) (1) (A), (B).
1"Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4(b) (5), 36 Fed. Reg. 6091 (1971).
106Taggart, supra note 50, at 118.
"
0 7 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4(b) (5), 36 Fed. Reg. 6091 (1971).
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tax rate, if he had sold either the long- or short-term capital gain property."8
This is not a situation envisioned by Congress in the enactment of section 170-
(e) (1), and the proposed regulations have adequately resolved the inherent
ambiguity of the statute.
E. The Percentage Limitations'"'
In general contributions to public charities are deductible in the year of con-
tribution up to a maximum aggregate of fifty percent of the donor's contribu-
tion base."' Contributions to organizations which are not public charities are
limited to the lesser of twenty percent of the donor's contribution base or the
excess of fifty percent of the donor's contribution base less his fifty-percent
contributions for the year.1"' This latter calculation is made without regard for
the thirty-percent contribution limits, so that the donor's thirty-percent contri-
butions for the year, even though not allowable in the current year, go to re-
duce the amount of twenty-percent contributions allowable in the current year.
For the donor with a $100,000 contribution base, $10,000 in fifty-percent con-
tributions, $40,000 in thirty-percent contributions, and $10,000 in twenty-per-
cent contributions, there is a deductible contribution for the year of $40,000
($10,000 in fifty-percent contributions plus $30,000 in thirty-percent contri-
butions). This donor is not allowed any twenty-percent contributions because
his fifty-percent contributions ($10,000) and "allowable" fifty-percent contri-
butions ($40,000) equal fifty percent of his contribution base.
The contribution of appreciated property that has been reduced in accordance
with section 170(e) (1) (B) will be subject to either the fifty-percent or twen-
ty-percent contribution limitations, depending upon the type of organization to
which the property is given. On the other hand, capital gain property produces
a charitable contribution equal to the full fair market value of the property and
is limited to thirty percent of the donor's contribution base."' However, if the
donor has only a small amount of capital appreciation involved in the property,
he can elect under section 170(b) (1) (D) (iii) to have that appreciation re-
duced in accordance with section 170(e) (1) (B). If this election is made, all
contributions to a public charity will be subject to the fifty-percent rather than
the thirty-percent limitation. To determine if this is a feasible alternative, each
donor will have to calculate the value to him of receiving a current, rather than
a postponed, charitable deduction, while comparing that value with the cost
of losing a charitable contribution equal to the section 170(e) (1) reduction.
In making this determination, it should be borne in mind that contribution
carryovers from prior years will have to be reduced as if section 170(e) (1)
applied to them in the year of the contribution.
.I.NT. REV. CODE of 1954, S 871(a) (2).
"' A detailed study of the interaction of the 20%, 30%, and 50% limitations together
with the appropriate carryover provisions is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally
Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-8, 36 Fed. Reg. 6096 (1971); Proposed Treas. Reg. §
1.170A-10, 36 Fed. Reg. 6100 (1971); Taggart, supra note 50, at 140-57.
"0 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 170(b) (1) (A).
'Id. § 170(b) (1) (B).
"1id. § 170(b) (1) (D).
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F. Observations on Capital Gain Property
With the increasing capital gains tax the donor who has appreciated property
that would have produced capital gain if sold could, in certain circumstances,
be in a better net worth position by contributing such property to a charity
rather than selling it. Every donor should, therefore, take the time to calculate
what method of disposing of the property would leave him in the greatest net
worth position. Additionally, if the appreciation inherent in the property con-
sists of both ordinary income and capital gain, a partial charitable contribution
is still possible for the appreciation element. The appreciation in the contribu-
tion that is attributable to the capital gain element can be calculated from the
following formula:"'
Capital Gain Total Capital Gain Fair Market Value of
Portion - If Entire Property X Contributed Portion
Were Sold Fair Market Value of
Entire Property
IV. INTERACTIONS
A. The Appreciated Property Rules and the Gift of a Remainder
Interest to a Charity
1. The Problem. Prior to the enactment of section 170(f) (2) (A) 11 the gift
of an income interest to a noncharitable recipient with a remainder to a charity
offered a small, but effective loophole in the tax laws. The trust fund was as-
sumed to earn a three and one-half percent rate of return, and this same rate
was also used to determine the present value of the income and remainder in-
terests. Thus, it was possible for the trustee to invest the corpus in high-income,
high-risk assets which would maximize income, but at the same time which
would produce little relationship between the percentages used to calculate the
value of the charitable remainder and the value actually received by the charity.
It was this enhancement of the income interest at the expense of the remainder
that Congress sought to eliminate."'
2. Congressional Response. Although the Treasury recommended no change in
the treatment of charitable remainder interests in its proposals before the House
Ways and Means Committee,"' the modifications as set forth by the House
easily won Treasury approval. ' The Ways and Means Committee sought to
assure that the charitable deduction received by the donor was in accord with
the amount received by the charity by requiring that the remainder be in the
form of a charitable remainder annuity trust (in which the income beneficiary
is paid a fixed sum of dollars) or a charitable remainder unitrust (in which
the income beneficiary is paid a certain percentage of the assets yearly). By
coupling this with the requirement that a gift of a remainder not in trust must
meet the trust rules, the House proposals would have required a donor's chari-
113 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4(c) (4), 36 Fed. Reg. 6092 (1971).
1 14 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 170(f) (2) (A).
5 H.R. REP. No. 91-413 (Part 1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1969).
... 1969 House Hearings 5372-79.
'..1969 Senate Hearings 803-05.
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table contribution deduction to more accurately reflect the relative fair market
values of the income and remainder interests."'
The Senate Finance Committee generally agreed with the position of the
House,1 9 although in some circumstances it appears to have accepted the argu-
ment that this lack of flexibility would cause an undue curtailment of charitable
gifts."' The Finance Committee viewed the curtailment of a deduction for a
pooled income fund arrangement and for the outright gift of real property,
such as a residence with the retention of a life estate, as unduly restrictive.''
To remedy this deductions were proposed for these types of contributions."'
The basic statutory pattern envisioned by the Finance Committee was accept-
ed by the conference committee." The pertinent statutory provision states:
In the case of property transferred in trust, no deduction shall be allowed ...
for the value of a contribution of a remainder interest unless the trust is a
charitable remainder annuity trust or a charitable remainder unitrust . . . or
a pooled income fund."4
In the case of a contribution (not made by a transfer in trust) of an interest
in property which consists of less than the taxpayer's entire interest in such
property, a deduction shall be allowed ... only to the extent that the value of
the interest contributed would be allowable as a deduction ... if such interest
had been transferred in trust."'
(a) Basic Operation. In order for the contribution of a remainder to a chari-
ty'" to receive a deduction in the year of the establishment of the trust," the
trust must be a charitable remainder annuity trust,"' a charitable remainder
unitrust,"' or a pooled-income fund."' Through the use of any form of these
vehicles for the contribution of a remainder to a charity"' the amount of the
"IH.R. REP. No. 91-413 (Part 1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 56-57, 58-60 (1969).
"IS. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1969).
"' 1969 Senate Hearings 50.
"' The problem with excluding both these arrangements, as viewed by the Finance Com-
mittee, is that a charitable deduction would not be allowed solely because it would not be
possible to form them into an annuity or unitrust arrangement.
12 For valuation purposes the income interest for the pooled-income fund is to be valued
at the highest value in the last three years or if the fund has not been in existence that
long, then at 6%. S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 88 (1969). For the outright
remainder gift, depreciation (straight line) or depletion and a 6% discount factor are to
be taken into account. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 170(f) (4).
"13H.R. REP. No. 91-782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 295-96 (1969).
"INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 170(f) (2) (A).
"Id. § 170(f) (3) (A).
1' The Tax Reform Act has not answered the question of whether the gift of a remain-
der interest is "to" or "for the use of" a charity. Presumably it will be considered a "to" gift.
Alice Tully, 48 T.C. 235 (1967). This is the position recently taken by the Treasury, ex-
cept when the remainder is to be held in trust after the termination of all prior interests for
the benefit of the charity. In this latter case the Treasury views the remainder as being "for
the use of" the charity. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-8(b), 36 Fed. Reg. 6097 (1971).
This distinction is crucial because only gifts "to" a charity gain the benefit of the 50% de-
duction limit. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 170(b) (1) (A).
117 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 170(f) (2) (A).
"28 id. § 664(d) (1).
12 Id. S 664(d) (2).
30 Id. 642(c) (5).
3' The Treasury has taken the position that an annuity trust or unitrust must be such
in every respect; consequently, no combinations are allowed. Proposed Treas. Reg. S
1.664-1 (a) (2), 36 Fed. Reg. 18668 (1971). The only apparent justification for this posi-




charitable contribution. will be the present value of the remainder in ques-
tion."' If it is assumed that the donor, age fifty, transfers $100,000 of property
to a charitable remainder unitrust 4 under which the trust is to pay him five
percent of the fair market value of the assets in the trust as determined at the
beginning of the year with the payment to be made at the end of the taxable
year and this transfer is made on January 1, 1970, then the present value of
the remainder is $37,816." If the basis of the property contributed to the trust
equals its fair market value on the date of funding the trust, then $37,816 is
the amount of the donor's charitable contribution (assuming that the percent-
age limitations are met and that the property is either real property or intangi-
ble personal property)."
(b) "Property Transferred in Trust." As a matter of statutory interpretation
the word "property" in section 170(f) (2) (A) would refer to that property
placed in trust in the initial funding. This is a reasonable interpretation, since if
the word "property" referred to the remainder itself, the statute would have the
strained grammatical reading that for a "(remainder) transferred in trust, no
deduction" is allowed "for the value of the contribution of a remainder interest
unless the trust is a charitable remainder" annuity or unitrust or a pooled-in-
come fund."' Likewise, if the word "property" meant remainder, the statute
would have to read that a deduction would be allowed for the contribution of
"the" remainder. Under the preferred interpretation, on the other hand, the
statute means that when property is transferred to a trust which provides for
a remainder interest to be given to a charity, there is no charitable deduction
for the amount of that remainder unless the provisions of this section are met.
(c) Section 170 (e) "Contribution of Property." After determining the chari-
32Id. § 1.170A-6(b), 36 Fed. Reg. 6094 (1971).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.64 2(c)-6 (1971); Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.664-2(c), 36 Fed. Reg.
18673 (1971); Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.664-4, 36 Fed. Reg. 18671 (1971).
'.. In the instance of a charitable remainder unitrust § 664(d) (2) states that a fixed
percentage of the assets (not less than 5%) is to be distributed annually. However, only
the trust income need be distributed (if it is less than the fixed percentage) on the condi-
tion that any undistributed amounts are made up in later years. INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
§ 664(d) (3). Therefore, with $100,000 in trust assets and a 5% valuation figure, $5,000
needs to be distributed. However, if the trust income were only $4,000, then this amount
could be distributed if the $1,000 deficit were made up in later years. On the other hand,
the Treasury mistakenly interprets this provision as allowing the distribution of only the
trust income or the trust income plus any deficits. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.664-3 (a) (1) (i),
36 Fed. Reg. 18674 (1971).
"The $37,816 value is calculated in accordance with Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.664-4 (b),
36 Fed. Reg. 18676 (1971), as follows: The adjusted payout rate is 4.717%, or 5% X
.943396 (from Table F). To then obtain the interpolated factor, Table E(1) yields:
4.6% for a male age 50 = .38623





The interpolated factor is .37816, or .38623 (4.6% for a male age 50) less .00807. There-
fore, the present value of the remainder interest is: $100,000 X( .37816 = $37,816.
13 However, if this future interest had been tangible personal property, the charitable
contribution would have been taken into account only after the rights of the donor and
all those related to him in the property had expired. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 170(a) (3).
137/d. § 170(f) (2) (A).
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table deduction allowable under section 170 (before the application of the per-
centage limitations) on the contribution of a remainder interest, the reduction
provisions of section 170(e) (1) would seem to come into play upon a literal
reading of the statutory language providing a reduction for "the amount of
any charitable contribution of property otherwise taken into account under this
section." Both the legislative history and the proposed regulations support the
application of section 170(e) to this gift of a future interest funded with ap-
preciated property."9
The crucial question is determining the meaning of the term "property," as
used in section 170(e) (1), in the context of a remainder interest. A literal
reading of the phrase "amount of any charitable contribution of property" '
might lead to the conclusion that the "property" referred to is the remainder
interest itself. As pointed out by Professor Taggart," such a reading of the
statute is untenable because a remainder interest of section 306 stock containing
ordinary income appreciation could escape a reduction, if the donor could "age"
this remainder before its contribution. Likewise, a contribution of a remainder
interest with capital gain appreciation might have to be reduced under section
170(e) (1) (B) unless the remainder was also so aged. Thus, although the sta-
tute is ambiguous in its operation, logic points to the reading of the word "prop-
erty" in section 170(e)( 1 ) to mean the total assets placed in the trust at its
funding, from which eventually the remainder is to be drawn. This reading by
implication has been accepted by the Treasury in its promulgation of the pro-
posed regulations under section 170(e)."' As a consequence, this donation is
viewed as a gift of less than the donor's entire interest in the appreciated prop-
erty, so as to invoke the allocation of basis provisions between that portion of
the property contributed and that portion not contributed.'"
With the charitable contribution of a remainder interest being viewed in this
manner, the donor's adjusted basis at the time of the contribution (here the
time that the deduction is allowed, which is the year of the funding of the
trust) is allocated so that:
Fair Market Value of
Adjusted Basis of Contributed Portion 14' Adjusted Basis
Contributed Portion = Fair Market Value of of Entire Property
Entire Property
Then the amount of appreciation taken into account for the purposes of section
170(e) (1) is the amount of gain which would have been recognized if the
contributed portion had been sold by the donor at its fair market value at the
'lProposed Treas. Reg. S 1.170A-6(b) (2), 36 Fed. Reg. 6094 (1971). Presumably,
the determination will first be made of the value of the charitable deduction which is "allow-
able." If this deduction is not "allowed" in the current year because the percentage limita-
tions have been exceeded, then a carryover under § 170(d) should be in order. This is the
only equitable result.
'"
9 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 170(e) (1).
"4Taggart, supra note 50, at 114-16.
141 Proposed Treas. Reg. S 1.170A-6(b) (2), 36 Fed. Reg. 6094 (1971).
'4 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 170(e) (2).
"* For the purposes of this formula the fair market value of the remainder interest is
taken to be its present value. See note 133 supra.
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time of the contribution to the charity.'" Thus, in the example previously men-
tioned if $100,000 in property is used to fund a trust with a basis of $45,000,
then the portion of the adjusted basis allocated to the contributed remainder in-
terest would be $17,017.1" This means that the amount of gain which would
be taken into account under section 170(e) (1) would be the fair market value
of the remainder interest ($37,816) less the adjusted basis for the contributed
portion ($17,017), or $20,799. If the amount of the appreciation is attributa-
ble to ordinary income property, the amount of the charitable deduction for
the donor in the year of the trust's creation is $17,017, or the amount of his
basis in the contributed portion." If, on the other hand, the appreciation is
subject to reduction under section 170(e) (1) (B) the amount of an individu-
al's charitable deduction is $27,417.'
B. The Appreciated Property Rules and the Gift of an Income
Interest to Charity
1. The Problem. Prior to the Tax Reform Act a donor could contribute a $10,-
000 income interest to charity with a remainder to a family member, for ex-
ample, and be better off than if he had simply kept the income interest him-
self. 4' If the donor were in the seventy-percent top marginal tax bracket, an
income interest of $10,000 would net him $3,000. However, by giving this
$10,000 income interest to a charity for five years, the donor would not be
taxed on the income and would currently receive a charitable contribution of
$45,151.' Thus, in addition to obtaining this deduction immediately with the
property finally going to someone of his own choosing, the donor is at least
$16,606 better off over a five-year period."°
2. Congressional Response. The Treasury recommendations to curb this abuse
were directed at not allowing a charitable deduction for an income interest
unless the donor was taxable on the income from the trust."' The House Ways
'"Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4(c) (1), 36 Fed. Reg. 6091 (1971).
141 Since the present value of this remainder interest is $37,816, the calculation would be:
$37,816
$100,000 x $45,000 = $17,017 adjusted basis of contributed portion of the property.
'46 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 170(e) (1) (A).
14'This is composed of the $17,017 basis plus 50% of the $20,799 appreciation, or
approximately $10,400, to yield $27,417.
148 1969 House Hearings 5150.
14 This is using the valuation table as set forth in Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(f) (1958).
Under the new valuation tables, however, this interest would give only a $42,124 value.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-10(f) (1970). In comparing these figures it should be remembered
that a donor could give the charity an income interest for two years or more and not be
taxed on the income as it accrued. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, ch. 736, § 673(b), 68A Stat.
227. This latter provision was deleted by Congress in 1969. Tax. Reform Act of 1969, Pub.
L. No. 91-172, § 201(c), 83 Stat. 560.
150The $16,606 figure is obtained by subtracting from $31,606 (the value of the chari-
table deduction at the 70% tax rate), the $15,000 ($3,000/year X 5 years) which the
donor would have obtained if he retained the income interest. Of course, there should be
added to this amount an interest factor, which would make the net to the donor even greater.
"'.1969 House Hearings 5150-51, 5374. This means that beginning in 1970 for the
donor in the 70% tax bracket a gift of $10,000 over a 5-year period would have a present
value of $42,124, as set forth in note 149 supra, and $7,000 in income taxes yearly. In 5
years he will pay $35,000 in ordinary income taxes to leave a minus net worth position of
$5,513 ($29,487 value of the charitable deduction less $35,000). The donor must calculate
1971]
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and Means Committee followed the Treasury recommendations by proposing
that the amount of the income interest be allowed as a charitable deduction
only if the donor were taxable on the income or all the property was given to
charity, and providing also for a "recapture" of a portion of the charitable de-
duction if the donor ceased to be taxable on the income." ' In addition, the in-
come interest had to be in the form of an annuity or unitrust to insure a reason-
able correlation between the amount of the charitable deduction and the income
actually going to the charity."'
Although the Treasury recommended to the Senate Finance Committee that
long-term income interests of at least twenty years be exempt from this rule,154
both the Senate Finance Committee" and the conference committee15 accepted
the proposals of the House Ways and Means Committee. The pertinent pro-
visions of the statute as enacted are:
No deduction shall be allowed under this section for the value of any interest
in property (other than a remainder interest) transferred in trust unless the
interest is in the form of a guaranteed annuity or the trust instrument speci-
fies that the interest is a fixed percentage distributed yearly of the fair market
value of the trust property (to be determined yearly) and the grantor is treated
as the owner of such interest for purposes of applying Section 671.'
This paragraph shall not apply in a case in which the value of all interests in
property transferred in trust are deductible"
(a) General Operation. Section 170(f) (2) (B) provides generally that to
be deductible, the income interest must be a guaranteed annuity or a specified
percentage of the value of the assets in the trust, and the grantor must be taxa-
ble on the amount of this income. Assuming that the grantor were taxable on
the income from the trust, the remaining requirements could be fulfilled by
having the trust pay an annuity to the charity of, for example, $5,000 per year.
when he could obtain a savings under this technique by use of the following formula:
D -B
Y AC For the purposes of this formula, Y = percentage return needed for each
of the years that income is paid to the charity, D = net to donor after ordinary income
taxes if he had retained the income interest, B = value of the charitable deduction less
ordinary income taxes over the period in question, A = number of years income is to be
paid to the charity, and C = value of the charitable deduction. Here the formula yields:
Y = $20,513/$147,435 = 14%. If the donor can earn more than a 14% NET return
per year on the $29,487 value of the charitable deduction, he will be in a better financial
position by making the contribution. Thus, the gift of an income interest has been all but
effectively eliminated for this donor.5 I H.R. REP. No. 91-413 (Part 1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 60-61 (1969); H.R. REP. No.
91-413 (Part 2), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1969).
153/d.
154 The rationale for the Treasury proposal was that the donor had effectively given the
property away in such a circumstance. 1969 Senate Hearings 797-99.
155 S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 91-93 (1969).
156H.R. REP. No. 91-782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 296 (1969).
1
5 7 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 170(f) (2) (B). However, it should be noted that the
Treasury takes the position that the income interest, whether in trust or not, for which a
deduction is allowed under §§ 170(2) (B) or (f) (3) is "for the use of" the charity and
not a gift "to" the charity, so that it will not qualify for the 50% limitation under S
170(b) (1) (A). Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-8(b), 36 Fed. Reg. 6096 (1971).
1
.INT. REV. CODE of 1954, S 170(f) (2) (D).
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Alternatively, if the value of the trust assets were $100,000, the grantor could
satisfy these requirements by having the trust pay a specified percentage of
these assets to the charity each year. If this percentage were seven percent, then
in the current year $7,000 would be paid to the charity. In this way the Treas-
ury hopes to assure that at least a certain sum of money is going to the charity.
A literal reading of section 170(e) (1) would lead to the conclusion that
there would have to be a reduction for the amount of appreciation inherent in
the contribution of an income interest. However, the problem of determining
what the word "property," as used in section 170(e), refers to in the context
of an income interest has been partially alleviated by the recent Treasury pro-
nouncement that income interests for which a deduction is allowed under sec-
tion 170(f) (2) (B) do not come within the ambit of section 170(e). 5 ' The
most direct result of this position is that the income interest governed by section
170(f) (2) (B) is not reduced for the appreciation of any property used to
fund the trust. Indeed, this would seem the most equitable position to take,
since the grantor (donor) will be taxable on the amount of the income any-
way. Therefore, a further reduction by the amount of the appreciation in the
property used to fund the trust (which will probably revert to the donor any-
way) could put the donor in a worse position than if he had simply used his
normal salary to make the charitable contribution.
If the income contribution consists of, for example, the interest element from
a bond, " this would be a contribution of less than the donor's entire interest
in such property. It seems clear that no charitable deduction would be allowed
for this contribution because the interest element would not be in the form of
a guaranteed annuity or unitrust interest.'"' However, when the interest element
is all that the donor owns, section 170(f) (3) (A) will not apply, since a dona-
tion of this interest element would be the donor's entire interest in the property.
Section 170(f) (2) (B) would not apply because the donation will not be in
trust. Because a deduction is not "allowed" for this interest under section 170-
(f) (2) (B), the contribution will be subject to the reduction rules of section
170(e). ' As a consequence, the next inquiry concerns the manner in which
these reduction rules apply when correlated with section 170(f) (3) (A).
Here the term "property," as used in section 170(e), can mean only the in-
come element itself, since this is the only "property" the donor has. Thus, when
the donor has disposed of the bond and makes a charitable gift of the retained
interest element, the reduction rules of section 170(e) (1) (A) would most
"' Since the term "ordinary income property" does not include an income interest with
respect to which a deduction is allowed under § 170(f) (2) (B), and since a comparable
statement is not found with regard to "section 170(e) capital gain property," the inference
is that the Treasury will not apply 5 170(e) (1) (A), but that it would apply 5 170(e)-
(1) (B) to the same transaction to which 5 170(f) (2) (B) applies. Proposed Treas. Reg. 55
1.170A-4(b) (1), (2), 36 Fed. Reg. 6091 (1971). It is submitted that this inequitable re-
sult is without logical foundation.
'""These cases have usually involved the gift of an income interest to a noncharitable
recipient. See, e.g., Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
' In accordance with 5 170(f) (3) (A) this contribution is tested under the trust rules
of 5 170(f) (2) (B). Here, although the "form" of the income element does not qualify,
the donor would be taxed on the income, presumably under 5 673(a), if this had been a
transfer in trust, so that the second half of the 5 170(f) (2) (B) requirements would be
met.1'OSee note 159 supra.
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likely come into play. The theory would be that the sale of this interest would
have produced ordinary income in much the same way as an assignment of
wages. "' Since the donor would have had no basis in these interest coupons, the
value of the charitable contribution would be reduced to zero. This donor will
also probably be taxed on the future accrual of income from the donated inter-
est element.1" However, at the same time, he will not be allowed a charitable
deduction in those future years, since the deduction has to be taken in the year
of contribution, regardless of the year in which income is recognized." Thus,
this donor gains no comfort from the Treasury's position of not applying section
170(e) when income is recognized in the same year as the contribution and
because of the contribution,'" since the income will be recognized only in later
years.
If the taxpayer donates an income interest which he has received by gift, de-
vise, or bequest to charity, again the term "property," as used in section
170(e), must refer to the income interest itself, since this is the only "property"
the donor has. If this income interest is contributed to a public charity, the donor
will receive a deduction for its full fair market value,' while a gift to a private
foundation subject to section 170(e) ( 1 ) (B) would be reduced by fifty percent
of the entire value of the income interest. The reason for this, of course, is that
the donor would have had no basis in this property upon its sale. "8 On the
other hand, if a prospective donor retained a life estate in property which he
had originally purchased while selling the remainder for its present value, it
would seem that section 1001(e) would not be applicable. " ' Therefore, any
reductions necessitated by section 170(e) (1) (B) would apply only to the ex-
cess of the fair market value of the income interest less its adjusted basis."'
However, in both these instances unless the donor's effective capital gains tax
113A good discussion of the cases in this area may be found in 2 J. MERTENS, THE
LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION S 18.02 (1967). It is possible that this could be
viewed as a capital transaction. See note 167 infra.
... This was the Treasury's position on the gift of back-interest coupons which had been
issued by the Japanese government on certain prewar bonds. Rev. Rul. 58-275, 1958-1
CUM. BULL. 22. See S.M. Friedman, 41 T.C. 428, aff'd in part, 346 F.2d 506 (6th Cir.
1965).
I1 1NT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 461(a).
1
"Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4(a) (3), 36 Fed. Reg. 6091 (1971).
167 This assumes that the disposition of an income interest which is all the taxpayer owns
(for example, a life estate) would be a capital transaction. See Bell's Estate v. Comm'r,
137 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1943).
'The rationale here is that S 170(e) relates the reduction rules to the hypothetical
situation of the character and amount of gain if the contributed property had been sold.
If the income interest acquired by gift, devise, or bequest had been sold, the gain would
have been the total amount realized. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1001(e).
169 This would certainly be true if the donor had sold the remainder interest, since the
Treasury would not be able to argue that the basis of the income interest was determined
by reference to §§ 1014 or 1015. It should also be noted that unlike a gift of the use of
property, § 170(f) (3) does not specifically state that the gift of an income interest is al-
ways less than the donor's entire interest in the property. There is thus no statutory pro-
hibition against this procedure. See Taggart, supra note 50, at 91-92.
'70Assume that the donor owns property with a fair market value of $10,000 and a
$4,000 basis. The donor sells a remainder interest in this property to a third party when
the present value of the remainder interest is 50%. If the donor then immediately contri-
butes the income element to a charity, only $3,000 ($5,000 present value of the income
interest less $2,000 basis allocated to the income interest) would be subject to the S
170(e) (1) (B) reductions (if a variation of the step-transaction doctrine were not ap-
plicable to this situation).
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was in excess of thirty percent, he would be better off to sell the property and
retain the proceeds. 1'
(b) Section 170(f)(2)(D). The combined effect of the proposed regulations
and section 170(f) (2) (D) has left some interesting interpretative problems.
Section 170(f) (2) (D) provides that the remainder and income provisions of
section 170(f) do not apply if all interests in the property are transferred to
a charity. Thus, if the income interest is given to charity X, and the remainder
interest is given to charity Y, the donor does not have to be taxed on the in-
come, the income does not have to be an annuity or percentage of the assets,
and the remainder does not have to be in the form of a remainder annuity
trust, a remainder unitrust, or a pooled-income fund. For the purposes of illus-
tration, assume that property with a fair market value of $100,000 and a basis
of $45,000 is contributed by a fifty-year-old donor to two different charities
so that one receives an income interest and the other a remainder interest. The
present value of the life income interest is $67,997, and the present value of the
remainder is $32,003' Using these facts, there are at least three possible in-
terpretations of the statute.
First, both of the contributions could be treated as a unit. In this situation the
unitary charitable contribution would be $100,000. The appreciation of $55,-
000 would cause a reduction in the amount of the charitable contribution
(if any) under section 170(e).' This first interpretation has the force of a
literal reading of the statute because the exclusionary language of section 170-
(f) (2) (D) leaves only the provisions of section 170(e) to be applied to the
gift. It is expected that the Internal Revenue Service would rely upon this in-
terpretation, and this is only equitable because these same results would apply
if the entire property had been given to one charity rather than having different
types of interests split between two charities.
Secondly, the gifts could be considered unitary for the purposes of section
170(f) (2) (D), and yet separate for the purposes of applying the reduction
provisions. Even though section 170(f) (2) (A) and (B) would still be inap-
plicable, the argument would be that the allocation of basis provision applies
because the phrase "less than the taxpayer's entire interest in the property con-
tributed""17 refers to each contribution unit separately. In accordance with this
interpretation the remainder portion would be allocated a fair market value of
$32,003 and an adjusted basis of $14,401.75 Here the reduction provisions of
section 170(e), if applicable, would apply to the $17,602 appreciation. With
respect to the income interest, the provisions of section 170(f) (2) (B) do not
apply, but presumably the provisions of section 170(e) would because a con-
tribution of the income interest is not "allowed" under section 170(f) (2)-
171 See notes 77-78 supra.
..
2Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-10(f), Table A(1) (1970).
17'Presumably 67.997% of the reduction would be born by the income interest, and
32.003% would be born by the remainder interest.
114 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 170(e) (2).
a" The adjusted basis of the remainder would be calculated as follows:




(B).' Thus, under this interpretation of the statute the reduction provisions
would be applied in one of two ways. Under the first alternative the value of
the income interest of $67,997 would be subject to the reduction rules of sec-
tion 170(e). This view takes the word "property," as used in section 170(e),
in the context of an income interest to mean the income interest itself.
Although this is a possible interpretation of the statute, it totally disregards the
allocation of basis provision which was applied to the remainder interest, and,
thus, is not a very reasonable interpretation. Under the second alternative the
portion of the appreciation in the property used to fund the trust which is at-
tributable to the income interest (here $37,398)'.. would be subject to the re-
duction rules under section 170(e). This interpretation views the word "prop-
erty," as used in section 170(e), in the context of an income interest to mean
the assets underlying the income interest. This is the more logical reading of
the statute.
Although the second possible interpretation involves the meshing of two
components for certain provisions of the Code and their separation for others,
this reasoning is not without precedent. ' The prospective donor, except for one
possible situation, would be well advised to "stay clear" of this argument.
He could gain no advantage over the results in the first interpretation,
and he could even have a greater reduction in the amount of his gift (under
the more logical reading of the statute) when compared with the gift of the
entire property to one charity. The possible exception would be when one of
the gifts is thought not to require a reduction under section 170(e) (1) (B),
but it later turns out to require such a reduction. In anticipating this result,
the donor may not want to commingle the gifts, and thus jeopardize his gift,
which was not subject to any reduction provisions.
The final possibility is that there are two completely separate contributions.
Under this interpretation the income interest is totally separate and distinct
from the remainder interest. This is an instance of the left hand not knowing
what the right hand is doing. Here the remainder interest would be tested under
the rules of section 170(f) (2) (A) without regard to the testing of the income
interest under the rules of section 170(f) (2) (B). Unless the rules of each
section were satisfied the interest in question would fail to qualify, which pre-
sumably is what happens in the hypothetical above. This last alternative is the
least reasonable. If the property involved were something on the order of se-
curities which were placed in separate trusts, then the argument that these items
could be separated metaphysically would be on firmer ground. However, here
the use of one piece of property from which two separate interests are created
does not lend itself as well to metaphysical division. Being the least advanta-
geous to the taxpayer in requiring that both the provisions of section 170(f)-
(2) (A) and (B) be met, it is doubtful that any taxpayer would want to ad-
70 See note 159 supra.
177 This figure represents the total appreciation of $55,000 less the $17,602 appreciation
attributable to the remainder interest. The same results could be obtained by subtracting
from $67,997 (the fair market value of the life estate) the basis allocated thereto under §
170(e) (2), or $30,599 ( $67,997 x $45,000).$100,000




vance this interpretation to the Internal Revenue Service. Similarly it is not
anticipated that the Service would accept such an argument. However, if it
should, the force of the statement that the income and remainder provisions
will not apply when "the value of all interests in property transferred in trust
are deductible under section (a)"' 79 should prove to be a lethal weapon in the
conference or courtroom in preventing a reduction of the charitable contribu-
tion.
C. Interaction of the Bargain Sale and Appreciated Property Rules
1. The Problem. Prior to the Tax Reform Act a donor was able to "sell" ap-
preciated property to a charity at a value equal to his basis therein, treat the
amount realized as a return of capital, pay no income taxes on the appreciation,
and have a charitable deduction for the full amount of the appreciation "given"
to the charity.' Only in the situation in which the sales price exceeded his basis
would the taxpayer realize a taxable gain.' These advantages arose from view-
ing the transaction (both gift and sale) as a unit, rather than as a partial gift
and a partial sale. If, on the other hand, this latter, more logical view of treat-
ing the transaction as a partial gift and a partial sale were adhered to, there
would be a charitable deduction for the amount which was "contributed" to the
charity, and a realization of income on the portion sold in the amount of the
value received less the proportionate part of the adjusted basis allocated to the
sold portion. Obviously, this allocation method would not have produced re-
sults as favorable to the donor.
For the individual donor the value of the bargain-sale technique is aptly
shown in the following illustration. For all of these figures the fair market
value of the property subject to the bargain sale is $10,000, and its basis is
$4,000.
Effective
Sale 70 % Value Tax Rate on Net to
Price Contribution Deduction Appreciation Donor " '
1. 4,000 6,000 4,200 -0- 8,200
2. 6,000 4,000 2,800 1,400(70%) 7,400
3. 6,000 4,000 2,800 500(25%) 8,300
4. 10,000 -0- -0- 4,200(70%) 5,800
5. 10,000 -0- -0- 1,500(25%) 8,500
6. 10,000 -0- -0- 1,860(31%) 8,140
7. 2,000 8,000 5,600 -0- 7,600
8. -0- 10,000 7,000 -0- 7,000
A formula which can be derived from the table to inform the donor when a
bargain sale would be more advantageous than selling the property and retain-
ing the proceeds is when his top marginal tax rate plus the tax rate on the ap-
' 
7 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 170(f) (2) (D).
IS Rev. Rul. 69-102, 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 32; see William Waller, 39 T.C. 665 (1963).
'See Elizabeth H. Potter, 38 T.C. 951 (1962); Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(e) (1) (1960).
180 This column represents any amount realized by the donor on the sale plus the amount
of any savings available to him for the charitable contribution. In the instance of a sale of
the entire interest, it is the fair market value received less the appropriate tax. When a con-
tribution of the entire interest is made, it represents the tax savings to the donor. Thus, a
simplistic way to view the "net to donor" column is that this represents the effect of various
dispositions of property with a $10,000 fair market value upon the donor's net worth.
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preciation exceed 100 percent.8 ' Thus, if the top marginal tax rate were seventy
percent, and the tax rate on the appreciation twenty-five percent, the total
figure of ninety-five percent would dictate the selling of the asset and retention
of the proceeds, rather than using the bargain sale provisions. This result is
verified by items (1), (2), (3), (5), and (7) in the above illustration. How-
ever, if the taxpayer's top marginal tax rate were seventy percent, any tax on
the appreciation in excess of thirty percent would point to the use of the bar-
gain sale. This is borne out by items (1), (2), (3), (4), and (6) of the illus-
tration.
Such advantages to the donor were predestined for curtailment."4 The re-
sponse of Congress to this problem was the enactment of the new section
1011 (b). As will be subsequently developed, the problems created by this new
section, arising from the ambiguity of its language, are partially remedied by
the Treasury's new proposed regulations. However, not all of the benefits of the
bargain sale have been eliminated, so that the prospective donor should still
make the appropriate computation to determine that course of action which will
yield him the most benefits.
2. Congressional Response. Congress sought to curb the abuses inherent in the
bargain sale by providing in section 1011 (b) that the portion of the property
sold to the charity gives rise to income.18' Basically, the donor is considered to
have "sold" a percentage of his property to the charity and to have "donated"
the remainder. For the percentage of the property sold his amount realized
is the value which he receives, and his basis therein is the allocable portion of
13 See Berall & Enright, Tax Reform and the Donative Sale, 47 TAxEs 585, 587 (1960).
The rationale here would be that when the combined tax rate exceeds 100%, the percentage
amount in excess of 100% adds dollars to the donor in the "net to donor" column. For
example, with a top marginal rate of 70% the total percentage is 140%. The net amount
to the donor under a sale is $5,800, while the net under a bargain sale is $8,200, or an in-
crease of $2,400. This increase represents 40% times the appreciation of $6,000, or a re-
sultant $2,400.
Another way to visualize this result is that a top tax rate of 70% will be used to deter-
mine the value of the charitable deduction to the donor. In order to put the tax on the
appreciation in the same perspective, start with 100% and deduct the tax percentage on the
appreciation. Thus, a tax on the appreciation of 25% would give a 75% benefit to the donor
as opposed to a 70% benefit in the form of a charitable deduction. Likewise, a tax rate of
70% on the appreciation would give a benefit to the donor of 30% of the appreciation, as
opposed to a 70% benefit for a charitable contribution. In this latter instance the charitable
contribution in the bargain sale technique gives a net benefit to the donor of 40% of the
appreciation in question.
184 These advantages were widespread because as the formula in note 183 supra points
out, it would be to the donor's advantage to use the bargain sale technique for ordinary-
income property if his tax bracket exceeded 50%. Under the 1969 surtax rates single tax-
payers entered the 50% limit at only $20,000 taxable income, and married taxpayers filing
a joint return at $40,000, while under the 1970 tax rates single taxpayers entered the 50%
limit at $22,000, and married taxpayers filing a joint return at $44,000. Moore, Estate Plan-
ning Under the Tax Reform Act of 1969: The Uses of Charity, 56 VA. L. REV. 565, 566
(1970).
'" Although the Treasury had not made any recommendations in this area, the choice
of this method of dealing with the problem was envisioned by the House Ways and Means
Committee and gained approval in the conference committee. See 1969 House Hearings
5146-57, 5372-79; H.R. REP. NO. 91-413 (Part 1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1969); H.R.
REP. No. 91-782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 294 (1969). Thus, the argument of Senator Gore
that this provision was a modest step toward tax fairness carried the day. S. REP. No.
91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 82, 336 (1969).
CHARITABLE GIFTS
the entire adjusted basis in the property determined according to the following
formula:
Adjusted Basis Amount Realized Adjusted Basis
of Sold Portion - Fair Market Value X of Entire Property
of Entire Property
The donor's gain is then the amount realized less the adjusted basis of the sold
portion, with the character of this gain determined by the character of the
property involved in the transaction. The pertinent provision reads: "If a de-
duction is allowable under Section 170 (relating to charitable contributions)
by reason of a sale, then the adjusted basis for determining the gain from such
sale shall be that portion of the adjusted basis which bears the same ratio to
the adjusted basis as the amount realized bears to the fair market value of the
property." '186 This wording is not a model of clarity. An important question
left open by the statute is the relationship of the section 170(e) reduction pro-
vision to section 1011(b), and whether one must look first to section 170 or
section 1011 (b) when a bargain sale has occurred in order to determine the
effect of this transaction.
(a) "Is Allowable." The interpretation given the phrase "is allowable" gov-
erns the choice of section 170 or section 1011 (b) as the starting point. If this
phrase is interpreted to mean that a determination is initially made to set forth
the "allowable" charitable contribution before there can even be a bargain sale,
then obviously the provisions of section 170 are looked to first. This is the in-
terpretation adopted by the Treasury," ' and it is the most rational reading of
the language "[ilf a deduction is allowable., ' '
The alternative interpretation of this language is that there is first the allo-
cation into the "sale" portion and the "gift" portion of the transaction under
normal tax fundamentals.189 The gift portion of the property is then looked to
in order to determine if any reduction should be made under section 170(e).
Thus, it would be possible under this interpretation to have both the inclusion
of some ordinary income and a charitable deduction in offsetting, equal
amounts, when the interpretation espoused by the Treasury would not lead to
such a result.
There would be no difference in result between the use of the Treasury in-
terpretation or the alternative interpretation of the statute. However, if the
donor had a combination of fifty-percent and twenty-percent charitable contri-
butions, he could incur a greater tax liability with no corresponding charitable
deduction benefit. Assume that the donor has a $100,000 contribution base,
$30,000 in contributions to fifty-percent charities and $20,000 in contributions
to twenty-percent charities. He then makes a bargain sale to a twenty-percent
charity of property with a $10,000 fair market value for its $4,000 basis. If
the appreciation in this property were ordinary income, the Treasury view
would produce no charitable contribution, and, thus, the bargain sale provisions
8
aINT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1011(b).
... Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.1011(b)-2(a) (1), 36 Fed. Reg. 6109-10 (1971).
188 1NT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1011(b).189 See Taggart, supra note 50, at 130-31.
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would never be triggered. The result would be a sale of the property for its
$4,000 basis with no gain or loss being recognized. 9" On the other hand, the
alternative view would first require an allocation under the bargain sale rules.
The $2,400 of gain produced thereby would be taken into account as ordinary
income producing an additional $1,680 in taxes for the donor in the seventy-
percent tax bracket.9 ' However, there would be no corresponding charitable
contribution benefit because the limitations on twenty-percent contributions
have already been exceeded, and there is no carryover. " '
Thus, on balance, the Treasury reading of the statute remains the most logi-
cal and equitable. There is no taxation of "imaginary" gains in the instance of a
contribution of appreciated ordinary income property for which there would
be no corresponding tax benefit. The Treasury's statutory reading also success-
fully navigates the thorny issue of determining what the word "property," as
used in section 170 (e) (1), refers to in the context of a bargain sale. By look-
ing first to section 170 when property with a $10,000 fair market value is sold
to the charity for its $4,000 basis, the "contribution of property otherwise taken
into account"' " is the $6,000 appreciation.
(b) Deduction Allowable by Reason of a "rSale." Before the provisions of
section 1011 (b) become applicable, it is necessary that the charitable deduction
under section 170 be allowable by reason of a "sale." The significant fact for
donors is that the statute does not use the common phrase "sale or exchange."
A possible rationale for this deletion is that it was simply an oversight on the
part of the legislative drafters.'" Such an interpretation seems doubtful, how-
ever, since the committee reports make no reference to an exchange, and section
1011(b) is entitled: "Bargain Sale to a Charitable Organization."
Although the Treasury has taken the position that section 1011(b) applies
to both a "sale or exchange,""92 it is reasonable to assume that Congress did not
anticipate that the nonrecognition exchange provisions of the Code would be
used by donors. Assuming no cash or mortgages were involved, the donor
would simply own different property with no benefit from the charitable con-
tribution.'" The situation apparently envisioned by the Treasury involves, for
19According to the Treasury view, it is first determined that there is a $6,000 charitable
contribution. Since this contribution consists entirely of ordinary income appreciation, the
contribution is reduced to zero under § 170(e). Therefore, the donor receives only a $4,000
benefit from this transaction (the amount realized), and § 1011(b) never comes into play.
191 The alternative view would allocate $1,600 to the basis of the "sold" portion
($4,000 x 40%), leaving a $2,400 gain. This gain would yield $1,680 in taxes at the
70% tax rate. Next, $2,400 would be allocated to the basis of the contributed portion
($4,000 X 60%), leaving $3,600 ordinary income appreciation. After the 5 170(e) re-
ductions there would be a $2,400 charitable contribution, which, if deductible, would yield
a $1,680 benefit at the 70% tax rate.
192 The charitable contribution to a 20% charity is limited to the lesser of 20% of the
donor's contribution base or the excess of 50% of the contribution base over the allowable
contributions to 50% charities. (Therefore, all 30% contributions will go to reduce the
contribution limitations of 20% donations, even though these 30% contributions may not
be deductible in the current tax year.) If these limitations are exceeded, then there is no
provision for the carryover of the excess 20% donations. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, 5
170(b) (1) (B), 170(d).
.
931d. § 170(e) (1).
194 Such oversights have been made in the past. E.g., id. S 341(f) (1).
" Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.1011(b)-2(a) (1), 36 Fed. Reg. 6109-10 (1971).




example, the donor's transfer of property with a fair market value of $10,000
and a basis of $4,000 to a charity in a section 1031 exchange for property of a
like kind having a fair market value of $4,000. Here it would seem that the
charitable contribution is $6,000, so that the bargain sale rules are triggered.
However, any such nonrecognition exchanges seem unlikely, since the charity's
holding of business or investment property will give rise to unrelated business-
income problems.'97 Therefore, it is submitted that the Treasury's addition of
"exchange" to the statutory language to cover this situation is unwarranted.
On the other hand, if under these same facts the exchange consists of ma-
terially different types of property, there would be a recognition transaction.
The Treasury is justified in applying the bargain sale rules in this situation to
prevent the inequities which were rampant before the Tax Reform Act which
allowed cash or its equivalent to be received for the amount of the donor's
basis with the full amount of the appreciation in the property being taken as
a charitable deduction. Any other result would allow a donor to circumvent the
bargain sale rules. However, in this latter type of exchange the ordinary mean-
ing of the word "sale" as a transfer of property for money or its equivalent'"
would easily encompass the receipt of an annuity,"' and there is no reason why
it would not also apply to an exchange of dissimilar properties. It is submitted
that a court making this interpretation would be adhering to, rather than
thwarting, the obvious purpose of the statute,"1 so that the Treasury's addition
of the word "exchange" to cover this situation is likewise unwarranted.
3. Mortgaged Property Used in a Bargain Sale. In its proposed regulations..
the Treasury extends the Crane doctrine" to cause a realization of income to
the donor when property used in a bargain sale is subject to an indebtedness.
This rule applies whether the charity assumes the debt or not, and by their
terms, the proposed regulations apply only when there is a charitable contribu-
tion under section 170 by reason of a sale or exchange. In the instance of a
donor who merely contributes the property and receives nothing in return
there is no recognition, since this is not a sale or exchange.' For the recipient
'
97 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 511-13.
'
98 Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (1957).
199 Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965).
200 This is specifically provided for in Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.1011(b)-2(a) (4), 36
Fed. Reg. 6110 (1971). Prior to the Tax Reform Act, however, if the actuarial value of the
annuity received by the donor were greater than his tax basis in the property, gain would
be recognized to that extent. Otherwise, the difference between the fair market value of the
property and the actuarial value of the annuity would constitute a charitable contribution.
Rev. Rul. 62-136, 1962-2 CUM. BULL. 12.
"0 Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504, 510-11 (1941); cf. Commissioner v. Gillette
Motor Transp. Co., 364 U.S. 130, 134 (1960); Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, 356 U.S. 260,
265 (1958).
*2"Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.1011(b)-2(a) (3), 36 Fed. Reg. 6110 (1971).
"''Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
If this were not the case, the donor's contribution of property with a fair market value
of $10,000, a basis of $4,000, and a $2,000 mortgage would result in a bargain sale com-
puted in the following manner: the adjusted basis for determining gain under section
1011(b) would be $800 ($4,000 X $2,000/$10,000), which gives a $1,200 gain to be
recognized ($2,000 - $800). However, if this situation were considered a bargain sale,
then the same result would have to follow for property which was: (a) purchased with
$2,000 cash and $2,000 mortgage, (b) purchased with $4,000 mortgage which is now
$2,000 equity and $2,000 mortgage, and (c) purchased with $4,000 mortgage which still
remains as such. There is no logical foundation for such a result. It is one easily avoided by
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of like-kind property under section 1031, there will be no charitable contribu-
tion as long as the fair market value of the property received equals the fair
market value of the property given up, and, therefore, no recognition of income
from the mortgage because section 1011(b) is never activated." Likewise,
when full fair market value is received in a non-like-kind exchange, there is
no charitable contribution so that section 1011(b) never comes into play to
cause a recognition.'
In the normal bargain sale situation "the amount of the indebtedness shall
be treated as an amount realized." ' 7 If this phrase is interpreted to mean that
the indebtedness is treated as an amount realized in excess of the cash received
by the donor, the donor who purchased the property with a pre-existing mort-
gage thereon is penalized. The mortgage would be a part of his basis, and upon
the sale of the property for the amount of his basis, there is no equitable reason
for requiring him to recognize more income.0 8 On the other hand, if this
phrase is given the more reasonable interpretation that the amount of the in-
debtedness is an amount realized if it were not otherwise so treated, then no
inequity results. The donor would have to take the indebtedness into account
only when he had placed a mortgage on the property subsequent to its acquisi-
tion. In such a situation it is proper for the donor to recognize additional in-
come on a transaction that smacks of a cash wring-out."'
mortgaging property other than the one anticipated to be contributed, and it is submitted
that these inequities militate against such an interpretation. If, however, the donor is re-
lieved of liability for the indebtedness, he could be subject to taxation under, for example,
5 108.
205 Depending upon the particular facts, the donor may recognize income on the transac-
tion, but it will not be because of the bargain sale provisions. INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
1031(d); Treas. Reg. S 1.1031(d)-2 (1956).
..6 Gain would be recognized in such a transaction under the Crane doctrine, note 205
supra, and accompanying text, or Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (1957).
207 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.1011(b)-2(a) (3), 36 Fed. Reg. 6110 (1971).
208 If the mortgage were part of the purchase price so that the donor's basis ($4,000)
consisted of $2,000 mortgage and $2,000 cash, a bargain sale of the property at a basis of
$4,000 would cause the mortgage to be "realized." If the language of the proposed regula-
tions means that under these facts a sale of the property at its basis requires an additional
$2,000 to be recognized on account of the mortgage, then this donor is unjustly penalized.
Compare the following figures: (a) if the property is sold for its $4,000 basis (which in-
cludes a $2,000 mortgage) and the mortgage is considered "realized," the gain is $2,400
or $4,000 amount realized less $1,600 basis; or (b) if under these facts the $2,000 mort-
gage is considered realized in addition to the cash received, the gain is $3,600, or $6,000
amount realized less $2,400 basis. This extra $1,200 gain in the second example is caused
by the donor being considered to have recognized the $2,000 mortgage twice!
08 This reading would properly take the mortgage into account as an amount realized
only once, when the mortgage is a portion of the basis of the property in question. When
the mortgage has been added later, this is correctly considered an additional amount realized,
for otherwise, the donor would obtain an undue advantage using this technique. Consider
the following figures: (a) Capital gain property is involved with a basis of $4,000 and a
fair market value of $10,000. The mortgage of $2,000 is not a part of the basis. Thus, if
the mortgage is not included in the amount realized, the gain is $2,400 ($4,000 amount
realized less $1,600 basis) on which there is a $600 tax, assuming a 25% tax rate. The
charitable contribution thus becomes $6,000. In these circumstances the net to the donor is
$9,600 ($2,000 from the mortgage, plus $4,000 cash plus $4,200 value of the charitable
contribution at the 70% tax rate less $600 capital gains tax). This would be even more ad-
vantageous to the donor than selling the property and retaining the proceeds with the 25%
tax rate being applicable to the appreciation. (b) Assume the same facts except that the
$2,000 mortgage is considered as an amount realized in addition to the cash received. Here
the gain is $3,600 ($6,000 amount realized less $2,400 basis) on which the capital gains
tax is $900. The gift is $4,000. This means that the net to the donor is $7,900 ($2,000 mort-




4. The Percentage Limitations.1 ' The bargain sale rules require that a determi-
nation first be made whether a charitable contribution is "allowable" under
section 170,211 and the Treasury has taken the position that the percentage limi-
tation rules should be applied in making this determination.212 If it is assumed
that a donor with a $100,000 contribution base who has made $50,000 in cash
donations makes a bargain sale to a fifty-percent charity of capital gain property
with a fair market value of $10,000 for its $4,000 basis, there would be no
charitable deduction in the year of sale. With no charitable deduction being
"allowable" because the percentage limitations had been exceeded, section
1011(b) would not be triggered, and there would be no income recognition.
Here the $6,000 charitable contribution could be carried forward under section
170(d), and if it is assumed that this donor could take advantage of such a
carryover in later years, he would be able to successfully circumvent the bar-
gain sale rules.
To close this loophole the proposed regulations further provide that in such
a circumstance the bargain sale rules are applied in the year of the sale, regard-
less of whether the charitable contribution carryovers result in deductions in
the succeeding years.212 Thus, the Treasury has taken a very literal interpretation
of the word "allowable." In the fact situation posed, a charitable contribution
was "allowable" in the sense that absent the percentage limitations such a de-
duction could be taken. The percentage limitation only prevented this "allow-
able" deduction from being taken; therefore, a deduction was merely not
"allowed." The Treasury position is undoubtedly more in harmony with the
congressional purpose underlying section 1011(b), while at the same time
giving the donor some much needed guidance.
5. Continued Use of the Bargain Sale. The technique of the bargain sale has
been laid to rest for the donor with ordinary income property, since there is no
charitable deduction available under section 170(e) ( 1 ) (A). With capital gain
property the donor will receive less money through the bargain sale technique
than via a sale of the property and a retention of the proceeds. However, the
donor can come out ahead with the bargain sale as compared with simply con-
tributing the property to a charity."' Finally, when the reduction rules of sec-
tion 170(e) ( 1) (B) apply to the appreciated property used in the bargain sale,
the donor will still retain the greatest net amount from a sale and retention of
the proceeds; however in certain circumstances in which the basis of the prop-
erty exceeds fifty percent of the fair market value of the property the bargain
sale can still be more advantageous than the outright contribution."'
"'°See generally Taggart, supra note 50, at 135-39.21 1 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1011(b).212 Proposed Treas. Reg. S 1.1011-2(a)(1), 36 Fed. Reg. 6110 (1971).13 Id. § 1.1011(b)-2(a) (2).
214 For the donor in the 70% tax bracket with property having a fair market value of
$10,000, a basis of $4,000, the variable results are as follows: (a) a contribution of the
property to a public charity would be worth $7,000; (b) a sale of the property with reten-
tion of the proceeds would be worth $7,900, assuming a capital gains tax of 35%; and
(c) a bargain sale to a public charity at basis would be worth $7,360 ($4,000 cash realized
plus $4,200 value of the $6,000 contribution less $840 capital gains tax).
'"' For the taxpayer in the 70% top marginal tax bracket, if the basis of the property is




In 1969 Congress attempted to curb some of the more flagrant abuses in-
herent in gifts of appreciated property to charities. This certainly has been a
result of the Tax Reform Act of 1969. However, at the same time it is unfor-
tunate that Congress overacted in its zeal to solve a current problem. This re-
action has left a host of unanswered questions and doubts, even after the
Treasury's first efforts to solve some of the statutory ambiguities in its proposed
regulations. Hopefully though, tax equity will find its way through the com-
plexities left for posterity.
bargain sale is the preferable contribution technique. For example, if the property has a
fair market value of $10,000 and a basis of $6,000, the net amount to the donor is $7,400
or $6,000 cash received plus $2,240 value of the contribution (which sum is $4,000 -
($4,000 x 40%) (50%) = $3,200 X 70% or $2,240) less $840 capital gains tax, on
the bargain sale as opposed to a net value of $7,000 on the contribution of the property
to a charity. Therefore, the tax planner should make the appropriate computation for his
more wealthy clients, since the bargain sale may still be of some benefit to them.
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